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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SMALL BUSINESS
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT:
AN EARLY EXAMINATION OF WHEN AND WHERE
JUDGES ARE USING THEIR NEWLY GRANTED
POWER OVER FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
The battle between government regulators and big business is
a clash of titans. Well-funded federal agencies are staffed with
intricate networks of bureaucrats working to fulfill their legisla-
tive mandates and keep American businesses in line with public
policy, whether the issue is pollution, workplace safety, taxation
or the like.1 Big business is ready and able to combat their nem-
eses with big budgets for lobbying, legal work, and compliance
with the immense quantity of complex regulations enumerated in
the Code of Federal Regulations.2 All too often small businesses
are found floundering in the middle of this fray. Their business
practices inevitably leave them exposed to federal regulations
aimed at curbing the excessive practices of big business.3 Their
budgets, however, leave them without adequate resources either
to comply with or to fight intrusive federal regulators. In 1996,
Congress gave small businesses a weapon of their own in their
fight against this regulatory morass.4 The Small Business Regu-
1. See Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act:
New Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 29, 30 (1997).
2. See The Cost of Federal Regulations on Small Business: Joint Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Small Bus. and the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong.
46-54 (1995) [hereinafter The Cost of Federal Regulations] (report of the Office of*
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), on the changing burden of
regulation, paper work, and tax compliance on small business); Paul R. Verklil, A
Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 221-23.
3. Small businesses often work in the same fields as large businesses, merely on
a smaller scale. See Office of Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin., Small Business Profile,
1998 (visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http'//www.sba.gov/ADVO/statsprofiles/98us.html> [here-
inafter Small Business Profile].
4. See Mark Lewyn, Fewer Strings Attached: A New Law Lets Little Guys Sue to
End Excess Paperwork, BUS. WK., May 13, 1996, at 26 ("Now, small businesses will
have a chance to drive Washington bureaucrats up the wall once in a while."). See
generally infra notes 65-121 and accompanying text (giving background information on
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latory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996' (SBREFA) contained a
judicial review provision giving individuals or entities the power
to challenge federal agencies in court if the agencies do not ade-
quately take into account the disparate impact their proposed
regulations will have on small businesses.6 It remains to be seen
whether this new weapon will be effective in assisting small
businesses to survive in the current regulatory predicament.
This Note addresses the problems small businesses face in
fighting or complying with federal regulations aimed primarily
at the activities of big businesses, and Congress's legislative
response to these problems. The primary focus is the initial
response to the judicial review provision contained in SBREFA.
A review of existing case law demonstrates that small entities
have prevailed using SBREFA in cases in which there was a
gross violation of federal rulemaking procedures by an agency,
but failed when using SBREFA in cases in which the agency
made some effort to comply with those requirements.
The first section of this Note examines the importance of
small businesses and their plight in complying with federal
regulations.7 This section analyzes data from a variety of sources
to show that compliance with federal regulations is often a mat-
ter of fixed costs.8 The interests of large businesses in federal
policymaking are better represented thanks to their ability to
hire lobbyists.9 Additionally, large businesses have entire de-
partments that deal with regulatory compliance.' ° Small busi-
nesses often face the same regulatory requirements of these
larger businesses, but lack the resources with which to fight or
comply." Data indicates that the amount expended on compli-
ance with federal regulations is much higher proportionately for
small businesses. 2
congressional efforts to alleviate the disparate impacts of federal regulations on small
entities).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
7. See infra notes 27-64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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The second section describes Congress's attempts at remedy-
ing this plight through the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 19801"
(RFA) and SBREFA's amendments to the RFA.'4 The RFA at-
tempted to alleviate some of the disproportionate strain placed
on small businesses by requiring federal agencies, as part of
their regulatory promulgation process, to take into account any
disparate impacts that small entities might face.15 An analysis of
the legislation's effects shows that the RFA had little effect on
the federal rulemaking process, in part, because it allowed agen-
cies to certify with very little supporting data that their regula-
tion would not have a disparate impact on small entities and,
therefore, that a cost-benefit analysis was not required." Fur-
ther, small businesses had no remedy when the agencies' conclu-
sions were wrong.'7 Congress, in an attempt to address this
problem, passed SBREFA, which included, among other things,
a judicial review provision allowing individuals or entities to
challenge federal agency violations of the RFA in court.'"
The third section looks at some of the early court cases that
have arisen as a result of the new power given to small busi-
nesses by SBREFA.' 9 In two instances, federal district court
judges have found federal agency violations of the RFA's require-
ments sufficiently egregious to warrant a remand of the regula-
tion to the agency for further research into its disparate impact
of the regulation on small entities.2 ° Four other cases involved
regulations that were deemed valid by federal circuit and dis-
trict court judges in spite of the objections to the manner in
which the agencies complied with the requirements of the RFA.2 '
Finally, the fourth section analyzes this case law and predicts
how courts will decide similar cases in the future.22 In the two
cases in which regulations were remanded, the agency had obvi-
13. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164-65 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601).
14. See infra notes 65-121 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79, 84-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-81, 87-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 122-222 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 122-66 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 167-222 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
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ously promulgated its regulation with little regard for the re-
quirements of the RFA, or had conducted its study of the pro-
posed regulation's effects in a disingenuous manner.23 In the
four cases in which the regulation was upheld, it was unclear
whether the analysis required by the RFA had been thoroughly
conducted, but it was clear to the judge that a good faith effort
had been made.24 This analysis leads to the conclusion that
small entities can expect to receive some protection from the
RFA and SBREFA, but that this legislation is not a shield from
every disparate impact resulting from federal regulation.25 Addi-
tionally, agencies should be on notice that Congress and the
courts are serious about the procedures involved in the
rulemaking process and that an utter disregard or contempt for
these rulemaking procedures will only stand in the way of their
rulemaking agenda.26
SMALL BUSINESSES AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Importance of Small Businesses
Small businesses are important in several respects. First, in
terms of contribution to the gross national product, a healthy
small business sector is vital to the success of the economy.2" Of
all private firms in the United States, 99.7% are considered
23. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
27. See Office of Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin., The New American Evolution: The
Role and Impact of Small Firms, June, 1998 (last modified June 12, 1998) <httpl/
www.sba.gov/ADVO/stats/evol-pap.html> [hereinafter New American Evolution] ("The
crucial barometer for economic and social well-being is the continued high level of
creation of new and small firms in all sectors of the economy by all segments of
society.... Are small firms important? Yes. The impressive performance of the U.S.
economy over the past six years can be contrasted with the rather lackluster perfor-
mance in both Europe and Japan. This divergent macroeconomic performance can be
explained in part by differences in competition, entrepreneurship and new firm start-
ups."). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Spe-
cial Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 539-40 (1998)
("Small firms do not produce disproportionate quantities of social 'goods.' They do
produce massively disproportionate quantities of social 'bads.' In any event, there is
no empirical support for the widespread contrary belief, and there is no plausible
meritocratic rationale for conferring favored treatment on small business.").
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small businesses. 28 These firms contribute roughly half of the
country's private nonfarm gross product.29 In 1997, income gen-
erated by sole proprietors and partners rose 4.3% to $503.8 bil-
lion.30 The success of the American economy, particularly in the
last few years, can be attributed to "fostering and promoting
entrepreneurial activity."' In fact, "[t]he emerging conventional
wisdom seems to suggest that small firms and entrepreneurship
are both necessary for macroeconomic prosperity."32 The Small
Business Administration's Office of Advocacy explains small
business' contribution to the economy in terms of "efficiency and
dynamics."33 The efficiency contribution stems from the fact that
"there are certain things small firms do better than large
firms." 4 One example is that small firms are often better inno-
vators.35 Another example is that, in certain situations, it is
cheaper for a large firm to contract out services to or buy sup-
plies from smaller firms. 6 The dynamic contribution of small
firms stems from the fact that the small business sector of the
economy is better equipped to change and adapt to a given mar-
ket than are its larger competitors.3 "
Second, one should care about small businesses because a
healthy small business sector is necessary for job creation. Small
firms employ over half of the nation's workforce. 8 Additionally,
28. See Office of Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin., Characteristics of Small Business
Employees and Owners, 1997, § 2.1 (visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http/www.sba.gov/ADVO/
stats/ch.empo.html> [hereinafter Characteristics] ("Of the 5,369,068 employer firms
(excluding self-employed individuals without employees) in 1995, 78.8 percent had
fewer than ten employees, and 99.7 percent had fewer than 500 employees.").
29. See New American Evolution, supra note 27, at tbl.2.
30. See Small Business Profile, supra note 3.
31. New American Evolution, supra note 27. The Office of Advocacy of the U.S.
SBA has pointed to three factors in the resurgence of the American economy: (1) the
"entrepreneurialization" of large businesses, (2) the blossoming of new and small
start-up companies, and (3) the entry of women, minorities, and immigrants into the




35. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
36. See New American Evolution, supra note 27.
37. See id.
38. In 1996, 56.5% of all employees in the United States worked for firms employ-
ing less than 500 employees, which generally is the standard defining small busi-
142920001
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there are 10,507,000 self-employed workers in the United
States.39 From 1992 to 1996, firms with fewer than 500 employ-
ees created all of the new jobs in the United States.4' As larger
firms continue to streamline and downsize, small businesses will
be relied upon to keep Americans working.4' Not only do small
businesses employ over half of all Americans, they employ those
Americans who often cannot find work anywhere else. Very
small firms hire part-time employees "at a rate almost twice
that of very large firms.... Overall, 20.5% (11.5 million) of
small firm workers were part-time employees in 1996, compared
to the 17.4% (7.5 million) of large firm workers."42 Thus, parents
and others who wish to work, but cannot do so full-time, have a
better opportunity of finding an employment situation that fits
their needs at a small firm. Small firms also employ a "higher
ratio of employees with lower educational levels."43 The small
firm workforce employs about thirty million workers with a high
school degree or less, compared with the nineteen million em-
ployed by larger firms.44 In addition, small firms hire more em-
ployees receiving public and financial assistance than do larger
firms.45 Thus, not only do small businesses contribute greatly to
the overall employment of America, but they hire more individu-
als who otherwise would remain unemployed.
Third, small businesses, particularly the newer, start-up
firms, "play a crucial role in experimentation and innovation,
which leads to technological change and productivity growth."4 6
Small firms are prolific innovators because "[ilnnovations arise
ness. See Characteristics, supra note 28, at tbl. 2.1.
39. See Small Business Profile, supra note 3.
40. See id. Firms with less than 500 employees generally are considered to be
small businesses, although, as will be discussed later, the SBA has more specific defini-
tions of small businesses that vary by the type of industry in which the firm does busi-
ness. See Characteristics, supra note 28, § 1; infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
41. See New American Evolution, supra note 27.
42. Characteristics, supra note 28, § 3.3. Firms with less than 10 employees hire
31.7% of their employees on a part-time basis compared to firms with more than
1000 employees who hire only 17.7% of their employees on a part-time basis. See id.
43. Id. § 3.4.
44. See id.
45. See id. § 3.5.
46. New American Evolution, supra note 27.
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only when property rights are properly aligned."47 This occurs
more in small firms because "small firms can hold clear property
rights."48 In other words, there is no reason for an entrepreneur
to take her innovation to a larger firm where the proceeds of
that innovation will have to be shared when she can start her
own small business and keep all the profits for herself.
Finally, small firms are an avenue through which women, mi-
norities, immigrants, and others who find themselves unable to
find conventional economic success can gain access to the main-
stream economy.49 Over the last twenty to thirty years, female
small business ownership has increased from 5% to 38%.50 This
is important not only for its economic empowerment of women,
but also because "raising children and self-employment seem to
go together, and home-based firms have the capacity for both."51
In a similar fashion, small business ownership by minorities
increased between 1987 and 1992 from 8.8% of total firms to
12.5%.52 The importance of these developments, according to the
Office of Advocacy, is that "these businesses are building a com-
munity and developing networks, and therefore will grow and
prosper in the future.""3
Disproportionate Impact of Federal Regulations on Small
Businesses
Despite the equal footing of small businesses in the economy,




50. See id. Women make up 37.4%, or 4.2 million, of the self-employed with earn-
ings. See Characteristics, supra note 28, § 5.1.
51. New American Evolution, supra note 27. Studies have substantiated that
"workers [in smaller companies] report having fewer work-family conflicts." Shelly M.
MacDermid et al., Organizational Size and Work-Family Issues, 562 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 111, 122 (1999).
52. See New American Evolution, supra note 27.
53. Id.
54. See generally Pineles, supra note 1, at 29-32 (discussing the need for regulatory
flexibility for small businesses); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Small Business Regu-
latory Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 123, 124-26 (1997) (same);
Verkuil, supra note 2, at 215-23 (same).
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estimates, small firms shoulder 63% of the total cost of comply-
ing with federal regulations. 5 Several reasons exist for this dis-
parity.
First, federal regulations typically are written with bigger
businesses in mind.56 When Congress first addressed the prob-
lem of cost disparity in complying with federal regulations be-
tween large and small businesses, it found that "(1) small busi-
nesses were underrepresented in federal regulatory proceedings;
and (2) federal agency efforts to impose a 'one-size-fits-all' body
of regulation imposed disproportionate burdens on those small
businesses."57 It should surprise no one that federal agencies, in
trying to alleviate the social ills of industry, target their reg-
ulations on the most visible offenders-large businesses.58 Prob-
lems occur, however, when smaller businesses, which as a whole
create only a fraction of the problems of big businesses, are
forced to comply with an onerous regulation tailored for a much
larger business.59 Compounding this problem are the relatively
insignificant resources that small businesses are able to direct
toward lobbying efforts to change the rulemaking process to
better reflect their interests.6 °
55. See The Cost of Federal Regulations, supra note 2, at 39.
56. See Pineles, supra note 1, at 30.
57. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 96-878, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2788, 2788.
58. Although written in 1982, Professor Verkuil's assessment of the federal regu-
latory scene and its impact on small businesses still rings true today, to the dismay
of many small business owners:
EPA's effluent-reduction regulations have a greater impact on small busi-
ness than on large business because the regulations mandate compliance
techniques that are- less compatible with the production technologies of
small firms. DOE's record-keeping requirements concerning oil and gas
prices and volume are vague and unintelligible. OSHA is faulted for its
national-consensus standards, which burden small businesses that lack
technical expertise to interpret the requirements. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is criticized for promulgating unreasonable and complicated
ERISA regulations that, rather than protecting employee pension rights,
have the practical effect of terminating pension plans for employees of
small businesses.
Verkuil, supra note 2, at 221-22.
59. See Sargentich, supra note 54, at 125 ("[G]eneralized rulemaking does not
naturally look to the special needs of and burdens on small entities . . . ."). But see
Pierce, supra note 27, at 557-61 (describing the responsibility of small firms for a
disproportionate quantity of social bads).
60. See DAvID 0. STEwART, REPRESENTING SMALL BUSINESSES § 4.3, at 154 (1986).
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A second cause of the disparity in the costs of compliance
between large and small businesses is an economic consequence
of economies of scale. As Barry Pineles explains, "if the cost of
compliance with a federal regulation is fixed, then the smaller
firm will suffer a more severe impact since it has a smaller out-
put over which to recover the costs.""' A congressional study
proved this, finding that "the average annual cost of regulation,
paperwork, and tax compliance for firms with fewer than 500
employees is about $5,000 per employee, compared with about
$3,400 per employee for firms with more than 500 employees."62
Finally, small businesses have more trouble meeting federal
regulatory burdens because they lack the compliance resources
that make it easier for big businesses to deal with federal regu-
lations.63 Big businesses have administrative departments, legal
counsel, and other resources that they can devote exclusively to
researching regulations, filling out forms, and conducting other
tasks involved in complying with federal requirements. This al-
lows the rest of the company to undertake the regular business
of the firm. On the other hand, in the case of small businesses,
it is often the owner who is left alone to comprehend and comply
with federal regulatory requirements; a daunting task under-
taken in addition to his management duties."
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ASSIST SMALL BUSINESSES IN
COMPLYING WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
In the waning months of the Carter Administration, Congress
attempted to alleviate some of the problems of federal regulation
for small businesses by passing the RFA.65 The framers of the
61. Pineles, supra note 1, at 31; see also Sargentich, supra note 54, at 125 (noting
that small businesses face higher costs per unit of output than larger businesses
because they lack economies of scale); Verkuil, supra note 2, at 220-23 (same).
62. The Cost of Federal Regulations, supra note 2, at 38-39.
63. See Verkuil, supra note 2, at 221 (acknowledging the disproportionate burden
faced by small businesses in complying with the tax code).
64. See Pineles, supra note 1, at 30; see also 126 CONG. REC. S21,451-52 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 1980) (statement of Sen. Culver) (discussing the unfair impact uniform regu-
lations have on small businesses).
65. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (codified
20001 1433
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RFA intended it to address the fact that "uniform Federal regu-
latory and reporting requirements have in numerous instances
imposed unnecessary and disproportionately burdensome de-
mands.., upon small businesses, small organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions with limited resources."66 Ac-
cording to Professor Thomas Sargentich, "the underlying prem-
ise of the RFA was to require that agencies conducting notice-
and-comment rulemaking consider fully the effects of such
rulemaking on 'small entities .... ,67
Procedurally, the RFA does not prevent federal agencies from
promulgating regulations that have difficult compliance require-
ments for small businesses.6' Federal agencies in the process of
promulgating rules that will have a significant impact69 on small
entities7" must first complete an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis and publish the results of the analysis in the Federal
Register.7' Generally, this analysis must contain a description of
the regulation, the rationale for its promulgation, an estimate of
its cost, both in time and money, and a description of any alter-
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601).
66. Regulatory Flexibility Act § 2(a)(3), 94 Stat. at 1164. The underlying purposes
of the RFA recognize that "the practice of treating all regulated businesses, organiza-
tions, and governmental jurisdictions as equivalent may lead to inefficient use of
regulatory agency resources, enforcement problems, and, in some cases, to actions
inconsistent with the legislative intent of health, safety, environmental and economic
welfare legislation." § 2(a)(6), 94 Stat. at 1164.
67. Sargentich, supra note 54, at 124.
68. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (1994); Sargentich, supra note 54, at 125 ("The key
procedural requirement of the RFA is the preparation of initial and final regulatory
flexibility analyses ... to accompany, respectively, notices of proposed rules and
final rules that affect small entities."); infra text accompanying notes 239-40 (ex-
plaining the potential political ramifications of full disclosure).
69. For a discussion on the problems of defining "significant impact" in the con-
text of environmental rulemaking, see Keith N. Cole, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act: Could a Single Word
Doom the New NAAQS?, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 281, 287-92 (1998).
70. The RFA defines the term "small entity" as meaning "small municipalities of
less than 50,000 people, small nonprofit organizations and 'small business concern[sl'
as that term is defined by the Small Business Administration." Id. at 282 n.2 (citing
5 U.S.C § 601(3)-(6) (1994)); see also infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining how the SBA defines small businesses).
71. The initial regulatory flexibility analysis must be published at the time of the
publication of the general notice of proposed rulemaking and must contain a descrip-
tion of "the impact of the proposed rule on small entities." 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
2000] JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SBREFA 1435
native means by which the agency's objectives could be met.7 2
Once the proposed rule has been published, time is provided for
any interested parties to submit comments to the agency.73 A
final regulatory flexibility analysis is required when the final
rule is published in the Federal Register.74 Generally, this final
analysis must contain the same information as the initial regu-
latory flexibility analysis as well as responses to any relevant
comments the agency received after releasing the proposed
rule.75
Additionally, the RFA requires federal agencies "in April and
October of each year,... [to] publish in the Federal Register an
agenda of all rules under consideration, or likely to be consid-
ered, which would have a significant economic impact on a sub-
stantial number of small entities."76 The final requirement is
72. The analysis must contain the following-
(1) a description of the reasons why action by the agency is being consid-
ered; (2) a succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis for, the
proposed rule; (3) a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the
number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply; (4) a de-
scription of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes of
small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of
professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record; [and]
(5) an identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant Federal
rules which may duplicate, overlap or conflict with the proposed rule.
Id. § 603(b). Finally, the initial regulatory flexibility analysis must also contain a
list of "significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated
objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact
of the proposed rule on small entities." Md § 603(c).
73. See id. § 609.
74. See id. § 604(b).
75. The final regulatory flexibility must contain:
(1) a succinct statement of the need for, and the objectives of, the rule;
(2) a summary of the issues raised by the public comments in response
to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of the assessment
of the agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in
the proposed rule as a result of such comments; and (3) a description of
each of the significant alternatives to the rule consistent with the stated
objectives of applicable statutes and designed to minimize any significant
economic impact of the rule on small entities which was considered by
the agency, and a statement of the reasons why each one of such alter-
natives was rejected.
Id. § 604(a).
76. STEWART, supra note 60, § 4.1 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1982)).
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that federal agencies conduct periodic reviews of their regula-
tions to "determine whether such rules should be continued
without change, or should be amended or rescinded, consistent
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any
significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial num-
ber of such small entities.
There are two important points to keep in mind regarding the
RFA as it was originally enacted. First, an agency may promul-
gate the most egregiously onerous regulation for small businesses
so long as the requisite regulatory flexibility analyses are com-
pleted. Furthermore, if an agency promulgates a rule that does
not have a significant disparate impact on small businesses as
certified by the agency head, the agency may be exempted from
completing the analyses. 9 Second, at the time of its enactment,
the RFA provided: "[A]ny determination by an agency concerning
the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any
action of the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.""
Thus, any violation of RFA's provisions could be reviewed only
in conjunction with a broader case against the agency for violat-
ing the Administrative Procedures Act and not simply for a
failure to comply with the RFA.81
77. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a).
78. Although this may be politically challenging, it is, at least in theory, allowable
under the RFA. See Sargentich, supra note 54, at 135-36.
79. The RFA does not require agencies to complete initial or final regulatory flexi-
bility analyses "if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if promul-
gated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities."
5 U.S.C. § 605(b). If a certification is made, "the agency shall publish such certifica-
tion in the Federal Register, . . . along with a succinct statement explaining the
reasons for such certification." Id.; see also STEWART, supra note 60, § 4.10 (discuss-
ing the impact of allowing agencies to avoid the RFA's requirements).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 242, 110 Stat. 847, 865-
66 (1996).
81. As Barry Pineles explains:
Regulatory flexibility analyses were only part of the record upon review.
The court examined the analysis and, if it is so flawed that it undercut
the rationality of the rule, then the rule is invalid, not due to the
agency's failure to comply with the RFA, but because the rule violated
the rulemaking standards set out in the APA.
Pineles, supra note 1, at 37 (footnotes omitted).
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Need for Amendments
The RFA made strides in exposing the plight of small busi-
nesses in complying with federal regulations and in forcing fed-
eral agencies at least to consider the disparate effects of their
regulations on small entities.8 2 For several reasons, however, it
did not have the effect of significantly reducing the regulatory
burden on small businesses that its supporters had hoped it
would.83 The first problem with the RFA was federal agency
abuse of the certification provision." The provision was intended
to operate as an escape clause to avoid waste in the promulga-
tion of rules and regulations that had nothing to do with the
small entities.8 5 In practice, however, agencies abused the certifi-
cation provision by simply attaching boilerplate language to
their notice of proposed rulemaking stating that the requisite
secretary or administrator had certified that the proposed rule
would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of
small entities, even when the contention was clearly incorrect.
86
The RFA's second flaw was its disallowance of judicial review
if a federal agency's rulemaking process did not meet the Act's
requirements.87 Abuse of the certification requirement would not
82. See STEWART, supra note 60, § 4.1; Pineles, supra note 1, at 37 (lauding the
efforts of the FCC in reducing the impact of its regulations on small entities).
83. See Cole, supra note 69, at 284; Pineles, supra note 1, at 37-38; Sargentich,
supra note 54, at 126; see also supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (describing
the current burdens of federal regulations on small businesses).
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 605(b); STEWART, supra note 60, § 4.10; Cole, supra note 69, at
283; Sargentich, supra note 54, at 125; Verkuil, supra note 2, at 241-46; supra note
79 and accompanying text.
85. According to the Senate report accompanying the RFA at the time of its pas-
sage, the certification provision was intended to be given "great deference by the
courts" so long as it was "made in good faith and based on sound evidence." S. REP.
NO. 96-878, at 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2801. This certifica-
tion provision has been upheld in federal court. See Southwestern Growth Alliance v.
Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 106 (3d Cir. 1997).
86. See Cole, supra note 69, at 284-87 (describing the EPA's use of the certifica-
tion provision to avoid conducting a regulatory flexibility analysis despite "clear
indications from Congress and the Chief Counsel for Advocacy that the law required
[it]"); Pineles, supra note 1, at 38 & n.109; infra text accompanying notes 145-66
(describing the failure of the Department of the Interior to conduct a regulatory
flexibility analysis when evidence clearly showed that one was required).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 242, 110 Stat. 847,
865-66 (1996); supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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have been a crippling impediment to the RFA if small entities
had a remedy against those agencies who promulgated regula-
tions antithetical to the purpose of the RFA.8" Unfortunately,
under the RFA, small businesses generally did not have such a
remedy.89  The only exception, as explained by Professor
Sargentich, is "[w]hen judicial review of a rule [as a whole] is
instituted, any reg-flex analysis 'shall constitute part of the
whole record of agency action' in connection with such review."0
Thus, an incorrect or abusive certification by a federal adminis-
trator could be considered in court only as a factor when the
entire rulemaking process was being examined, but could not by
itself overturn a proposed rulemaking decision.
The third problem associated with the RFA was the constant
disregard for the law by some agencies.91 In hearings before the
104th Congress prior to the passage of SBREFA's amendments
to the RFA, Jere Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA,
explained:
Unfortunately... compliance with the RFA is inadequate.
Agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (with the Forest Service and Agricultural
Marketing Service being especially egregious violators), and
the Department of Interior, can ignore the RFA. The only
way to ensure that all agencies comply with the RFA, and
therefore consider the impact of their regulatory proposals on
small business is to modify the RFA so that agency compli-
ance can be tested in court.
92
Accordingly, although the procedural requirements of the RFA
showed promise in informing both government and industry of
the disparate impact of federal regulations on small businesses,
it failed to remedy the disparity because private forces were
unable to enforce its provisions by taking the agencies to court.
88. See Sargentich, supra note 54, at 126.
89. See id.
90. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 611(b)); see also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying
text (noting that judicial review of regulatory flexibility analyses was only available
under RFA if incorporated into review of a larger rulemaking process).
91. See STEWART, supra note 60, § 4.10.
92. The Cost of Federal Regulations, supra note 2, at 30 (testimony of Jere W.
Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. SBA).
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
In response to the aforementioned problems with the RFA and
the desire to give small businesses more protection against the
disparate effects of federal rules and regulations, Congress
passed SBREFA93 as part of the Contract with America Ad-
vancement Act of 1996.94 In justifying the legislation, SBREFA's
framers included a list of findings that, among other things, rec-
ognized the importance of small businesses and the problems
they faced in complying with federal regulations.95 Although
most of the provisions in SBREFA are beyond the scope of this
Note, it is useful to discuss these provisions briefly before turn-
ing to the provision that is most relevant: SBREFA's amend-
ments to the RFA that provide for judicial review.
Subtitle A of SBREFA attempts to address the problem of
rules and regulations that are written in such a manner as to
make them incomprehensible to the typical small business owner.
9 6
First, it requires federal agencies, as part of their rulemaking
process, to develop "small entity compliance guides [that] ex-
plain the actions a small entity is required to take to comply
93. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
94. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 110 Stat. 847, 857-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 611).
95. See id. § 202, 110 Stat. at 857. The findings section reads:
Congress finds that -
(1) a vibrant and growing small business sector is critical to creating jobs
in a dynamic economy;
(2) small businesses bear a disproportionate share of regulatory costs and
burdens;
(3) fundamental changes that are needed in the regulatory and enforce-
ment culture of Federal agencies to make agencies more responsive to
small business can be made without compromising the statutory missions
of the agencies;
(4) three of the top recommendations of the 1995 White House Confer-
ence on Small Business involve reforms to the way government regula-
tions are developed and enforced, and reductions in government paper-
work requirements;
(5) the requirements of chapter 6 of [RFA] have too often been ignored
by government agencies, resulting in greater regulatory burdens on small
entities than necessitated by statute; and
(6) small entities should be given the opportunity to seek judicial review
of agency actions required by chapter 6 of title 5, United States Code.
Id.
96. See id. §§ 211-216, 110 Stat. at 858-59; Sargentich, supra note 54, at 130-31.
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with a rule .... "9 The statute further stipulates that the guides
must be "written using sufficiently plain language likely to be
understood by affected small entities.""8 Second, subtitle A re-
quires agencies to work with small entities in a way that en-
hances the agency's ability to informally "answer inquiries by
small entities concerning information on, and advice about, com-
pliance with such statutes and regulations.""9 Although the out-
ward goal of subtitle A is to make federal regulations more un-
derstandable to small business owners, questions have arisen in
conjunction with this provision as to "whether the guides or
guidances will provide a basis for a court to hold an agency
estopped from acting in a manner contrary to that spelled out in
the guides or guidances. " "'
Subtitle B provides for changes in the way federal regulations
are enforced against small businesses." 1 It attempts to accom-
plish this in two ways. One such way is by establishing an En-
forcement Ombudsman at the SBA and Regulatory Fairness
Boards at each regional office of the SBA."'2 The Ombudsman
"work[s] with each federal agency to ensure that small entity
concerns are considered."0 3 The Regional Fairness Boards hear
the comments and complaints of small businesses in their region
and report those statements to the Ombudsman."° Second, sub-
title B requires agencies to "establish a policy or program. . . to
provide for the reduction, and under appropriate circumstances
for the waiver, of civil penalties for violations of a statutory or
regulatory requirement."0 5 "Overall, the hope is to 'change the
culture' of agencies to promote avoidance of enforcement activity
that is 'excessive and abusive.'' 10 6
97. Id. § 212(a), 110 Stat. at 858.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 213(a), 110 Stat. at 859.
100. Sargentich, supra note 54, at 130; see also § 222, 110 Stat. at 860-62 (reform-
ing the regulatory enforcements).
101. See §§ 221-224, 110 Stat. at 860-62; Sargentich, supra note 54, at 131-33.
102. See § 222, 110 Stat. at 860-62; Sargentich, supra note 54, at 131-32.
103. Sargentich, supra note 54, at 131; see also § 222, 110 Stat. at 860.
104. See § 222, 110 Stat. at 861; Sargentich, supra note 54, at 131-32.
105. § 223, 110 Stat. at 862; see Sargentich, supra note 54, at 132.
106. Sargentich, supra note 54, at 131 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S3243 (daily ed.
Mar. 29, 1996) (Joint Managers's Statement of Legislative History and Congressional
1440
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SBREFA
Subtitle C "amend[s] the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)
to allow small entities to recover attorneys' fees and costs attrib-
utable to substantially excessive and unreasonable demands by
an agency in a regulatory enforcement context." 10 7 The test for
the recovery of fees and costs is whether the original govern-
ment demand that led to the action is "substantially in excess of
the decision of the adjudicative officer and is unreasonable when
compared with such decision."'08 Though the clear intent of sub-
title C is to "change the culture" of federal agencies in their en-
forcement of regulations, critics worry that it merely will in-
crease the amount and stakes of litigation in the field." 9
Subtitle E authorizes a "legislative veto of regulations promul-
gated after March 29, 1996." 0 After receiving a mandatory re-
port from a federal agency for any regulation issued, "Congress
can then, by enacting a joint resolution, prevent the regulation
from taking effect unless the President vetoes the resolution
within thirty days of its passage.""'
Although the provisions mentioned above serve the essential
tasks of making important regulations more understandable and
providing a defense against particularly aggressive agencies,
none have had the potential impact of subtitle D and its judicial
review provision. Subtitle A only ensures that rules and regula-
tions are comprehensible to those who read them, something
that common sense dictates should be accomplished without a
legislative mandate." Subtitle B fights unfair enforcement of
regulations, but requires small entities either to file their com-
plaints through another federal agency or to attempt to obtain a
waiver from the agency that cited them for a violation;.. neither
seems to be a process that small businesses will undertake
readily. Subtitle C may be a powerful weapon, but is one that
must overcome a court's deference to governmental decisions
and can be used only when the process of enforcement has been
Intent)).
107. Sargentich, supra note 54, at 133 (footnotes omitted); see §§ 231-232, 110 Stat.
at 862-63.
108. § 231(a), 110 Stat. at 862-63.
109. See Sargentich, supra note 54, at 134-35.
110. Pineles, supra note 1, at 40 (footnote omitted); see § 251-53, 110 Stat. at 868-74.
111. Pineles, supra note 1, at 40; see § 251, 110 Stat. at 868-74.
112. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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undertaken and costs have been expended to defend oneself."4
Finally, although it offers an encouraging indication of the politi-
cal rise of the small business lobby, subtitle E requires disgrun-
tled small business owners to file their grievances through an-
other dubious governmental body-Congress." 5
Conversely, subtitle D provides a more substantial weapon in
the fight against regulations that are oppressive to small busi-
nesses, allowing them to take federal agencies to court." 6 Signif-
icantly, SBREFA takes steps apart from judicial review to pro-
mote more in-depth analyses of regulatory flexibility and to
avoid perfunctory certifications." 7 For instance, the new law
requires that:
[A]nalyses now must contain an estimate of the number of
small businesses that will be subject to regulation or the
reasons why the agency could not make that estimate; the
factual, legal, and policy reasons why the agency could not
take steps to minimize burdens on small businesses; and the
type of professional skills needed to comply with any
recordkeeping or reporting requirements.118
In addition, with regard to the certification process, SBREFA
mandates that the agency head "provide the factual basis for the
certification."" 9 Lastly, it establishes small business advocacy
review panels, coordinated by the SBA's Office of Advocacy and
made up of interested federal employees, who review feedback
from affected small business entities and report on their findings
to the agency promulgating the regulation. 2 °
Although these provisions are well-intended improvements in
the regulatory process, they ultimately will be ineffective with-
out the corresponding threat of judicial review because they
impose no meaningful sanction for an agency's noncompliance.
Thus, judicial review is the lynchpin of SBREFA's reforms be-
cause it provides the much needed reprisal for an agency's in-
114. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
116. See §§ 241-245, 110 Stat. at 864-68; Pineles, supra note 1, at 38-39;
Sargentich, supra note 54, at 127-29.
117. See supra notes 84-86, 91-92 and accompanying text.
118. Pineles, supra note 1, at 38 (footnotes omitted); see § 241, 110 Stat. at 864-65.
119. Pineles, supra note 1, at 38; see § 243, 110 Stat. at 866.
120. See § 244, 110 Stat. at 867-68.
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transigence with respect to the RFA's requirements. "If a small
business disagrees with either the final analysis or certification,
it can challenge the agency's compliance in court" and the court
may "delay the enforcement of the rule against small businesses
until the agency has complied with the RFA." 1' By holding over
the agencies the threat of going to court and having to start the
promulgation process anew, SBREFA imposes significant costs
on an agency's disregard of the RFA.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ACTION
In theory, the threat of litigation and a potential injunction
barring enforcement of an ill-considered regulation should be
enough to force federal agencies to give some consideration to
the requirements of the RFA. In practice, however, small busi-
nesses with valid complaints may find the court system to be ex-
pensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable. Whether small
businesses are actually willing to use the judicial review provi-
sion is vitally important to the success of the revamped RFA.
Accordingly, this section provides a preliminary survey of cases
that have been brought using the new judicial review provision.
Cases in Which Judicial Review Was Used to Remand Federal
Regulations
Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley
In Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley12 the National
Marine Fishery Service (NMFS), an agency within the Depart-
121. Pineles, supra note 1, at 38-39; see § 242, 110 Stat. at 865-66.
122. 995 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Fla. 1998); see also North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v.
Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding the economic analysis to be in-
sufficient and setting aside some of the quota); North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v.
Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that NMFS was not justified in
certifying that small entities would not be affected by its quotas and fish size limits
and ordering the agency to complete economic analysis on the effects of the regula-
tion on small entities). But see Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that a certification in a similar regulation was appropriate because
the language of the RFA "calls for the agency to consider the [significant economic]
effect on the entity, not the effect on revenue earned from a particular harvest");
Associated Fisheries v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that a certifi-
cation in a similar regulation promulgated before the SBREFA amendments was
justified using the pre-amendment requirements of the RFA).
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ment of Commerce, had promulgated rules establishing commer-
cial harvest quotas and minimum fish size limits for some spe-
cies of fish.1"s Initially, NMFS certified that the proposed rule
would not have "a significant economic impact on a substantial
economic number of small entities. " 24 NMFS justified its certifi-
cation "primarily because of the large degree of diversification in
fishing operations that exist in the fleet and the already short
shark fishing season." 25 Many disagreed with NMFS's initial
assessment of the effects of its rules on small entities.126 The
case record showed that "[c]omments from the public and from
the Small Business Administration included assertions that the
proposed rule may significantly injure a substantial number of
small businesses." 27
NMFS responded to these comments by reasserting in its final
rule that although many fishermen are considered to be small
businesses, the rule would not affect their economic interests
significantly because so few of them harvest only the types of
species restricted from harvesting by the rule. 2 In its final
regulatory flexibility analysis, NMFS concluded that, "'a reduc-
tion in quota should have relatively little impact on commercial
shark fishing firms since the season, even if cut by more than
half, would not adversely impact other harvesting operations
that take up the majority of the fishing season.""29
In Southern Offshore Fishing, the plaintiffs had two claims
relating to the RFA. The first was that "NMFS failed to prepare
123. NMFS, an agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of
the Department of Commerce, made the rules pursuant to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1980), which delegated
to the Secretary of the Treasury "broad authority to manage and conserve coastal
fisheries." Southern Offshore Fishing, 995 F. Supp. at 1416 (quoting Kramer v.
Mosbacher, 878 F.2d 134, 135 (4th Cir. 1989)).
124. Atlantic Shark Fisheries; Quotas, Bag Limits, Prohibitions, and Requirements,
61 Fed. Reg. 67,295, 67,298 (1996) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt. 678) (proposed Dec. 20,
1996).
125. Id.
126. See Southern Offshore Fishing, 995 F. Supp. at 1424.
127. Id.
128. See Atlantic Shark Fisheries; Quotas, Bag Limits, Prohibitions, and Require-
ments, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,648, 16,653 (1997) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt.678).
129. Southern Offshore Fishing, 995 F. Supp. at 1424 (quoting A.R. Vol. 5, tab IV-
K-34, at 32 (FRFA)).
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an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) pursuant to § 603,
solicit comments on the IRFA, and prepare a final regulatory
flexibility analysis (FRFA) incorporating public comment pro-
ceedings, pursuant to § 604."13 Implicit in this claim was the
allegation that the certification offered by NMFS, made pursu-
ant to § 605(b), was incorrect.1"' The second claim under the
RFA was that "the [final regulatory flexibility analysis] prepared
by NMFS failed to comply with § 604."132 Citing the judicial
review amendments of SBREFA, Judge Merryday found that,
"[bothNMFS's certification pursuant to §605(b) and the adequacy
of a [final regulatory flexibility analysis] are reviewable."13 3
NMFS rationalized their certification in terms Judge Steven
D. Merryday described as "suspiciously cryptic,"1" concluding
that
shark fishermen are nimble and adaptive in their fishing
operations (that is, they pursue sharks in the season as well
as other fish and at other times) and that the shark fishing
season was historically too brief to permit a prudent fisher-
man to rely exclusively on annual revenue from shark fish-
ing. 135
NM.FS estimated that the average gross revenue from shark
fishing was $26,426,136 but Judge Merryday soundly criticized
this statistic.
1 37
The commercial fishermen responded by "explaining their
dependence on sharks (especially [large coastal sharks]) and the
130. Id. at 1434 (footnote omitted).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(1) (1994)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing A.R. Vol. 5, tab IV-K-16, at 28).
136. See id. at 1435.
137. See 1d. Judge Merryday explained:
The record fails to contain an adequate explanation of the agency's calcu-
lation, if any, leaving no possibility to gauge its rationality, which is
manifestly suspect. Further, NMFS cannot demonstrate how the loss of a
major portion of $26,426 . . . would not . .. constitute a significant eco-
nomic impact on a substantial number of directed shark fishermen.
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quotas' punitive effect on their livelihood." 8' The SBA also was
critical of NMFS's certification, "stating that it was 'perplexed'
and 'bewildered' by the 'illogical' certification.""3 9 Based on ex-
pert testimony, Judge Merryday rejected NMFS's claim that
fishermen could easily subsidize their earnings by harvesting
other types of fish. 40 He explained, "One can no more readily
change a bass boat to a flats boat than change directed shark
fishing paraphernalia to equipment for profitable tuna fish-
ing." '4 Judge Merryday further cited the secretary of commerce's
past refusal to employ stricter quotas out of concern for the
industry as "incongruous" with his current stand that the quotas
would not have a significant impact on fishermen.'42 In finding
for the fishermen, Judge Merryday concluded from the record
that NMFS's rules would "significantly injure the prospects of
shark fishermen,"" 3 and that the certification and the final regu-
latory flexibility analysis failed to meet the requirements of the
RFA.
144
Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt
In Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt145 the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), an agency of the Department of Interior,
had promulgated a change in its regulations concerning the use
of public lands by private mining operations.' The relevant por-
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting A.R. Vol. 5, tab IV-K, at 13).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1436.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. In so concluding, Judge Merryday admitted to being "mindful that the
RFA does not require mechanical exactitude." Id. at 1437. He went on to stress that
"the statute compels the Secretary to make a 'reasonable, good-faith effort,' prior to
issuance of a final rule, to inform the public about potential adverse effects of his
proposals and about less harmful alternatives." Id.; see also Associated Fisheries v.
Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 114-15 (1st Cir. 1997) (drawing a parallel between section 604
of the RFA and the National Environmental Policy Act's environmental impact state-
ment and concluding that both require the Secretary to notify the public, in good
faith, about a proposal's adverse effects and less harmful alternatives before reaching
a final decision).
145. 5 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998).
146. See id. at 11-12.
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tion of the amended regulation, made pursuant to the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act,147 changed the size require-
ment for mining operations that are required to post a bond to
offset the cost of clean-up operations for abandoned mines on
public land.' 8 The effect of the regulation was that smaller to
midsize mining operations that previously had been able to oper-
ate without a bond, now were put in the position of having to
front a large amount of cash before they could begin opera-
tions. 49 In contrast, the regulations had little impact on larger
mining operations who had been posting bonds all along.50
BLM paid little attention to these concerns in its rulemak-
ing. '5 In its proposed rule, issued on July 11, 1991, the Depart-
ment of the Interior exercised its section 605 option under the
RFA to certify that an initial regulatory flexibility analysis was
unnecessary.'52 The certification contained no justification other
than, "[the rule] will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.""s In its final rule, pub-
lished over five and a half years after the proposed rule, BLM
published a slightly more detailed regulatory flexibility analysis
that continued to maintain that "the final rule will not have a
147. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The Act gives the Secretary of
the Interior the power to "manage public lands 'in a manner which recognizes the
Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals ... from public lands.'" Northwest
Mining, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (quoting 43 U.S.C § 1701(a)(12)). It acknowledges "the
need to manage the public lands 'in a manner that will protect the quality of scien-
tific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource,
and archaeological values,' id. at 11 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8)), and therefore,
gives the Secretary of Interior and the BLM the power to regulate so as to "prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands," 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
148. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 62
Fed. Reg. 9093, 9100-03 (1997) (amending 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) (final rule); Mining
Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,602,
31,604-05 (1991) (amending 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) (proposed July 11, 1991).
149. See Northwest Mining, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 16. The court noted that "the new
rule's requirements concerning the amount of regulation on the smaller notice level
mining operations, the dollar amounts the BLM can require for all bonds, and the
additional procedural expenses incurred by miners when obtaining the bonds, appear
to have a large impact on the small miner." Id.
150. See id. at 15.
151. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56
Fed. Reg. at 31,604.
152. See id.
153. Id.
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significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities."154
The most significant portion of the section addressing con-
cerns with the RFA, at least in the eyes of the court, was the
definition of "small entity" used by BLM as "an individual, small
firm, or partnership at arm's length from the control of any
parent companies."' 55 The analysis went on to admit that be-
cause some small entities would not be able to afford the bond
requirement, "the short-term impact of this rule on small enti-
ties will be to curtail some of their prospective [midlevel mining]
activities." 5 '
In their claim, plaintiffs alleged that "BLM did not use the
correct definition of 'small entity' (specifically, a small miner)
when it made the 'no significant impact' certification." 57 They
cited the RFA, which defines "small entity" as having "the same
meaning as the term[] 'small business." 58 "Small business" is,
in turn, defined by the RFA as having "the same meaning as the
term 'small business concern' under section 3 of the Small Busi-
ness Act."'59 The Small Business Act directs the SBA to set the
standards by which a business is considered small according to
the industry in which it operates. 60 According to the SBA's stan-
dards, "mining concerns must have 500 or fewer employees to be
considered 'small. 61
Using the power given to her by SBREFA, District Judge June
L. Green of the District Court of the District of Columbia found
that "[bly using a definition other than the SBA's, the BLM
violated the procedure of law mandated by the statute."6 2 In so
finding, she concluded, "Insofar as the BLM's certification...
was without observance of procedure required by law, the [plain-




157. Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1998).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 601(6) (1994).
159. Id. § 601(3).
160. See The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(2)(A) (1994).
161. Northwest Mining, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (division B)).
162. Id.
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tiff] is entitled to relief....' 63 Quoting the judicial review sec-
tion of the RFA, as amended by SBREFA, Judge Green noted
that in providing a remedy for such a violation
the court shall order the agency to take corrective action
consistent with this chapter... including, but not limited to
remanding the rule to the agency, and deferring the enforce-
ment of the rule against small entities unless the court finds
that continued enforcement of the rule is in the public inter-
est.'64
Finding that "not... much would change should enforcement be
discontinued,"'65 Judge Green remanded the rule.
6 6
Judicial Review Cases in Which the Regulation Was Upheld
Valuevision International, Inc. v. FCC
At issue in Valuevision International, Inc. v. FCC,16 were por-
tions of a FCC rule setting rates, terms and conditions for car-
riage of "leased access" programming on cable television sta-
tions.66 The applicable sections of the rule were promulgated
pursuant to powers granted to the FCC by the Communications
Policy Act of 1984;169 legislation enacted by Congress with the
intent of "bringing about 'the widest possible diversity of infor-
mation sources' for cable subscribers."7 0
In its Reconsideration Order setting the terms and rates of
"leased access" programming, the FCC issued an initial regulatory
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 611(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. m1 1997)) (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 16. Judge Green noted, "While recognizing the public interest in
preserving the environment, the Court also recognizes the public interest in preserv-
ing the rights of parties which are affected by government regulation to be ade-
quately informed when their interests are at stake and to participate in the regula-
tory process as directed by Congress" Id.
167. 149 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
168. Under leased access programming, "cable operators of systems with more than
thirty-six channels" were compelled "to set aside between 10 and 15 percent of their
channels for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the operator." Id. at 1206;
see 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1994).
169. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
170. Valuevision, 149 F.3d at 1206 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (1994)).
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flexibility analysis and sought written comments; 17' however,
community broadcasters did not complain during this comment
period.12 The FCC also issued a final regulatory flexibility analy-
sis in which it "addressed the effect of its rules on small leased
access programmers." 7 s
Despite the FCC's effort to comply with the RFA, Community
Broadcasters persisted in raising the issue:
Although the Commission performed the analysis required by
[the RFA and the Communications Act of 19341 ... the
Commission's analysis was insufficient because it focused on
the effect the rules would have on those cable operators qual-
ifying as small businesses and because it did not give ade-
quate consideration to the negative impact of the rules on
leased access programmers, most of whom are also small
businesses. 74
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was not as
amenable to the plaintiffs' complaint as the courts in the previ-
ously mentioned cases. 175 Circuit Judge A. Raymond Randolph
stressed that "the Commission's primary focus was on the small
cable operators, who were directly subject to the new rule." 176 In
denying plaintiff's petition for judicial review of the district court
decision, Judge Randolph noted that, as far as cable program-
mers were concerned, the Commission found that the revised
rules "would have only a 'positive' effect on programmers be-
cause they lowered the maximum rates for leased access service,
permitted resale, granted access to highly penetrated tiers, and
required part-time rates to be pro-rated. This analysis is suffi-
cient to satisfy the obligations of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act."1
77
171. See id. at 1212.
172. See id.
173. Id. In addition to having to comply with the requirements of the RFA, as
amended by SBREFA, the FCC also must abide by the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613, which requires the commission to "complete a proceeding for
the purpose of identifying and eliminating ... market entry barriers for . . . small
businesses in . . . telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (Supp. III 1997).
174. Valuevision, 149 F.3d at 1212.
175. See supra notes 122-66 and accompanying text.
176. Valuevision, 149 F.3d at 1213 (emphasis added).
177. Id. (citation omitted).
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American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA178 dealt with National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 7 s proposed in compliance
with the Clean Air Act (CAA),'" which "requires the EPA to
issue regulations establishing national air quality standards ...
[that] set ambient levels of air pollution that all areas of the
country must attempt to meet."18' According to the CAA, every
five years the EPA's Administrator is required to update the
national standards "for each air pollutant for which air quality
criteria have been issued."82 States then have three years to
adopt and submit to the Administrator "a plan which provides
for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the stan-
dard for every air quality criteria on which the EPA sees fit to
regulate.'3 If the EPA Administrator finds that a state has
failed to comply with the CAA, the EPA Administrator has the
option of promulgating a federal implementation plan for the
state.'8 ' If a state continues to ignore its responsibilities under
the CAA, the EPA Administrator may prohibit the awarding of
any federal highway funds or restrict the manner in which the
EPA grants permits.'85
To avoid having to conduct regulatory flexibility analyses for
all of the NAAQS, EPA Administrator Carol Browner consistently
has certified that the proposed standards would not have "a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities,"186 and thus do not require a regulatory flexibility anal-
178. 175 F.3d 1027 (1999).
179. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). There is not one final rule or pro-
posed rule that sets out the national ambient air quality standard for all areas.
Rather, the EPA has been progressively issuing the standards for different categories
of pollutants.
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(g) (1994 & Supp. M 1998).
181. Cole, supra note 69, at 286 (citing the Clean Air Act §§ 109(a) & 110(a), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7409(a) & 7410(a)).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) & (d).
183. Id. § 7410(a).
184. See id. § 7410(c).
185. See id. § 7509.
186. Cole, supra note 69, at 283; see, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Ozone: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,716, 65,747; National Ambient Air
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ysis. 87 The EPA rationalized that "the NAAQS themselves im-
pose no regulations upon small entities. Instead, the several
States regulate small entities through the state implementation
plans (SIPs) that they are required by the Clean Air Act to de-
velop." 88
According to Keith Cole, former Regulatory Affairs Counsel to
the Senate Small Business Committee, the EPA avoided its
responsibilities under the RFA by hiding behind the "bifurcated
nature" of the NAAQS rulemaking. 189 He explains his argument
as follows:
The imposition of regulatory controls is divided into a two-
step process of first, setting a general standard, followed at a
later point by the application of that general standard to
particular entities and the approval of each state's SIP. No
one can be directly and immediately subject to a NAAQS rule
in the sense that no one will ever face fines or penalties for
violating a national ambient standard.'90
In making its certification, the EPA relied greatly on two cases
decided prior to SBREFA's amendments to the RFA: Mid-Tex
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC9' and United Distribution
Cos. v. FERC.92 While the regulations involved in each case
were slightly different, both involved complaints by customers of
entities directly regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission which had been indirectly affected by the regulation
in the form of higher prices. 93 "In both cases, the impacts that
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638,
65,669; see also Cole, supra note 69, at 289 n.53 (quoting EPA Administrator Carol
Browner: "A SIP approval does not create any new requirements, but simply approve
[sic] requirements that the State is already imposing. Therefore, because the federal
SIP-approval process does not impose any new requirements, I certify that it does
not have a significant impact on any small entities affected.").
187. See Cole, supra note 69, at 289.
188. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410); see also Cole, supra note 69, at 287-89.
189. Cole, supra note 69, at 289.
190. Id. at 286-87.
191. 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
192. 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
193. In Mid-Tex, the plaintiffs were "wholesale customers of electric utilities whose
wholesale rates [were] regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission."
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these petitioners sought to bring within the RFA did not flow
from any new regulatory costs that might be imposed on small
entities."'" The court in Mid-Tex agreed with FERC's argument
that it was not required to complete regulatory flexibility analy-
ses concerning small entities that it did not directly regulate.
The court stated:
The problem Congress stated it discerned was the high cost
to small entities of compliance with uniform regulations, and
the remedy Congress fashioned-careful consideration of
those costs in regulatory flexibility analyses-is accordingly
limited to small entities subject 'to the proposed regulation.
We find a clear indication of this limitation in section 603 of
the statute, which specifies the contents of initial regulatory
flexibility analysis.195
The court in United Distribution relied on Mid-Tex in holding
that "no analysis is necessary when an agency determines 'that
the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a sub-
stantial number of small entities that are subject to the require-
ments of the rule.' FERC has no jurisdiction to regulate the local
distribution of natural gas."'96 Thus, the courts in each case held
that certification by the agency head was proper. 9 '
Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at 330. The dispute arose after FERC issued regulations allowing
electric utilities to "include in their rate bases amounts equal to 50% of their invest-
ments in construction work in progress (CWIP)." Id. The plaintiffs argued:
[A] FERC rule allowing CWIP in rate base will necessarily cause a price
squeeze in states that do not allow CWIP in rate base, because wholesale
rates, which FERC regulates, will rise as a result of CWIP, while retail
rates, which the states regulate, will not rise wherever CWIP is not
allowed.
Id. at 336.
In United Distribution, FERC issued several rules in an effort to deregu-
late the natural gas industry. See United Distribution, 88 F.3d at 1121-22. One
of these rules, like the rule in Mid-Tex, affected the rates that natural gas
companies could charge their customers by changing "from the preexisting
modified fixed variable (MFV) to a straight fixed variable (SFV) rate design."
Id. at 1161.
194. Cole, supra note 69, at 293.
195. Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
196. United Distribution, 88 F.3d at 1170 (quoting Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at 342).
197. See United Distribution, 88 F.3d at 1170; Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at 342; see also
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 467 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
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The EPA relied on this case for the proposition that regula-
tions that result in indirect impacts do not need regulatory flexi-
bility analyses. Keith Cole argues that Mid-Tex and United Dis-
tribution can be distinguished from the NAAQS rules because
"the NAAQS rules also trigger the imposition of regulatory costs
directly on small entities."198 He elaborates:
Mid-Tex and United Distribution phay stand for the proposi-
tion that the impact on small entities of possibly having to
pay increased prices for various goods and services may be so
indirect as to properly be excluded from consideration under
the RFA. However, the EPA's certifications in the NAAQS
rules would require a significant expansion of the holdings in
those cases to exclude the impacts on small entities of com-
plying with new regulations that are likely to be imposed
upon them as a direct and foreseeable consequence of
rulemaking.'99
In American Trucking Ass'ns, a group of small business truck-
ing interests had filed suit against the EPA over its NAAQS
rulemaking, in part because the EPA had not completed a regu-
latory flexibility analysis for the rule.200 The court rejected this
claim, stating, "We have consistently interpreted the RFA, based
upon these sections, to impose no obligation upon an agency 'to
conduct a small entity impact analysis of effects on entities
which it does not regulate."20 1 The court relied upon the decision
in Mid-Tex, noting that Congress had not altered section 605 in
its SBREFA amendments to the RFA.2 °' Further, the court did
not view the situation at hand as distinguishable from Mid-
Tex. 20
3
(finding that the RFA does not contemplate a regulatory flexibility analysis when the
regulation is deemed to have an insignificant impact on small businesses).
198. Cole, supra note 69, at 293.
199. Id. at 294.
200. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
201. Id. at 1044 (citing Motor & Equip. Mfrs., 142 F.3d at 467 & n.18).
202. See id. at 1045.
203. See id.
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Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA
In Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA,2 the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) underwent a prolonged promul-
gation of rules that placed restrictions on flights in the vicinity
of the Grand Canyon."' In so doing, the FAA had been acting to
enforce the National Parks Overflights Act,2"6 which Congress
enacted to combat the effects of flights over units of the National
Park System, including the Grand Canyon National Park."7
The FAA issued a proposed rule with a rather extensive initial
regulatory flexibility analysis that included examinations on the
cost of compliance as well as a consideration of alternatives to
the rule and concluded that the proposed rule would indeed have
"a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities."208 Interestingly, the FAA defined "small entity" for pur-
poses of the analysis as "a commercial sightseeing operator who
owns, but does not necessarily operate, nine or fewer air-
planes."20 9
When the FAA issued its final regulatory flexibility analysis,
it remained largely unchanged. It mentioned that only the SBA
had submitted comments on the proposed rule and concluded
again that the rule would have a "significant economic impact on
all commercial sightseeing operators conducting flights within
Grand Canyon National Park."2 10 It changed its definition of
204. 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2046 (1999).
205. See id. at 460-61.
206. Pub. L. No. 100-91, 101 Stat. 674 (1987).
207. See id. § 1(b), 101 Stat. at 674. Congress had found that commercial sight-
seeing flights over the Grand Canyon were causing "a significant adverse effect on
the natural quiet and experience of the park," as well as raising "serious concerns
regarding public safety, including concerns regarding the safety of park users." Id. §
(3)(a), 101 Stat. at 674.
208. Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, 61 Fed.
Reg. 40,120, 40,133 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93) (proposed July 31,
1996).
209. Id. at 40,132. Compare this definition with the definition used by BLM, see
supra text accompanying note 155, that Judge Green used to remand the regulation
back to BLM for further analysis. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
210. Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, 61 Fed.
Reg. 69,302, 69,326 (to be codified at 93 C.F.R. pt. 93) (final rule).
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"small entity" to "essentially... a commercial sightseeing air
tour operator [who] owns or operates nine or fewer aircraft."21'
At trial, plaintiffs complained that, among other alleged viola-
tions of the Administrative Procedures Act, the FAA "failed to re-
spond to comments on the inadequacy of its analysis under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, and failed to consider alternatives to
the rule it adopted. "2 Judge Merrick B. Garland disagreed, find-
ing that "[t]he FAA did a lengthy analysis of the economic im-
pact of the proposed rule on small businesses, as required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, and responded to comments submitted
by the SBA and other commenters. It also considered alterna-
tives to the rule."213 As far as the plaintiffs were concerned,
Judge Garland noted, "The Coalition does not describe any par-
ticular response as inadequate, nor does it point to any alterna-
tive that the agency irrationally rejected-other than the alter-
native of routing tours away from concentrations of visitors
which, as we noted above, the FAA reasonably could reject."214
Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance v. United States
In Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance v. United States2"5 a
collection of home health agencies in Texas brought suit against
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) seeking a
permanent injunction for allegedly violating the RFA in connec-
tion with a rule made pursuant to statute. 16 As part of the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997,2 7 Congress changed the method by
which Medicare paid home health agencies.1 8 Pursuant to those
changes, the Health Care Financing Administration, an agency
of HHS, promulgated regulations implementing Congress's
changes.219
211. Id. at 69,326 (emphasis added).
212. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 470 (N.D. Tex.), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2046 (1999).
213. Id. at 470-71 (citing Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon
National Park, 61 Fed. Reg. at 69,318-28).
214. Id. at 471.
215. 36 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
216. See id. at 766.
217. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 11 Stat. 251 (1997).
218. See Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
219. See id.; Medicare Program; Schedule of Limits on Home Health Agency Costs
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In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that HHS had violated
section 604(a)(5) of the RFA by failing to include in either of the
regulations "any examination of alternatives to the adopted
rule."22 The HHS admitted as much, but stipulated that "they
were not required to examine alternatives to the proposed rules
because the [statute] did not grant the Secretary of HHS any
discretion in implementing the [relevant provisions]."22' Judge
Barefoot Sanders agreed with HHS, finding that "Congress did
not intend for agencies to consider other alternatives when Con-
gress does not grant the agency discretion in creating the partic-
ular rule."222
ANALYSIS OF CASES
When Small Businesses Can Win Using the Judicial Review
Provision Under SBREFA
The cases discussed above appear to show two safe bets for
small businesses who want to challenge a regulation using
SBREFA's judicial review provision. As a result, federal agencies
should be wary of the following pitfalls. First, judges will be will-
ing to remand a regulation if there is a concrete mistake made
in the analysis. The clearest example of this comes from North-
west Mining Ass'n in which the agency used an incorrect defini-
tion of "small entity" in completing its regulatory flexibility analy-
ses. 2  The requirements of the RFA and SBFREFA are fairly
straightforward.2 If an agency ignores or subverts them, the
judicial review provision of SBREFA makes it easy for a judge to
remand a regulation for proper analysis by the agency in accor-
dance with the rules set out by the RFA.225
Per Visit for Cost Reporting for Periods Beginning on or After October 1, 1997, 63
Fed. Reg. 89, 92-93 (notice with comment period); Medicare Programs; Schedule of
Per-Beneficary Limitations on Home Health Agency Costs for Cost Reporting Periods;
Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,718.
220. Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
221. Id. at 769.
222. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 155-66.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77, 96-111.
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(4) (Supp. HI 1997).
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The second pitfall for federal agencies occurs when agencies
egregiously mishandle regulatory flexibility analyses as demon-
strated in Southern Offshore Fisheries Assn.228 If an agency's
regulation will have an obvious disparate economic impact on a
significant number of small businesses, it serves no purpose to ig-
nore such fact by certifying to the opposite effect. SBREFA's
judicial review provision now allows judges to recognize certifi-
cations that are disingenuous and remand them back to the
agency.22 Additionally, Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition dem-
onstrates that it is far easier for the agency in the long run to
complete the required analyses and, if necessary admit to the
effects of their regulation.228
Does the RFA Work?
These initial cases may have raised more questions than they
answered. Has the balance of power between small businesses
and federal agencies evened in the wake of these initial tests of
judicial review under SBREFA or has the balance shifted? Does
SBREFA really make a difference, or is it merely a statutory
obligation requiring more paper be pushed around our nation's
capital? Although these queries may be impossible to answer
until a case reaches a higher court, some initial findings may be
established.
First, judges give great deference to agencies in framing their
regulations and completing their regulatory flexibility analy-
ses.229 This should not be of great surprise as a court's job tradi-
tionally has been not to make the law, but rather to interpret
it. 2" 0 Within the scope of agency rulemaking, the judicial branch
has always given great deference to federal agencies in enforcing
the laws of Congress through rules and regulations. It is there-
226. See supra text accompanying notes 122-44.
227. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(4).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 204-14.
229. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 460 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (upholding the FAA regulation not because the rule was right, but out of
deference to the agency's "reasonable exercise of its judgment and technical exper-
tise").
230. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA= THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 143 (1990).
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fore logical that the courts involved in the aforementioned 'cases
would give great deference to the agencies in meeting the re-
quirements of the RFA23' and only remand a regulation when an
egregious violation of the RFA had occurred.232
In a second, related point, the cases showed also that the
RFA, even as amended by SBREFA, is still a very broad piece of
legislation that allows for a literal interpretation that may run
counter to the spirit of its intent. Nothing in the RFA or
SBREFA prohibits agencies from promulgating regulations that
are disproportionately more oppressive to small businesses, just
so long as they complete the requisite regulatory flexibility analy-
ses.23 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition exemplifies this very
point. After conducting its analysis, the FAA admitted that its
regulation would have an economic impact on small entities.2
The FAA considered alternatives and rejected them in favor of a
rule that makes it more difficult for air tour operators, predomi-
nantly small businesses, to conduct business in the Grand Can-
yon National Park. All of this was perfectly in line with the
requirements of the RFA and SBREFA, which brings into ques-
tion how much relief this legislation brings to small businesses
as long as federal agencies are willing to admit to the harshness
of their regulations.
Exacerbating this fact is the third finding from the cases that
agencies need only focus on small entities that the regulation
influences directly.2 5 Thus, in Valuevision International, the
agency was permitted to examine the effects of its regulation on
the small cable operators only,3 6 instead of making a broader
231. See supra text accompanying notes 167-222.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 122-66.
233. See Sargentich, supra note 54, at 135-37; see also National Propane Gas Ass'n
v. United States Dep't of Transp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 665, 681-83 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (find-
ing that the agency had considered the effect of its regulation on small businesses
and was justified in imposing those effects for the sake of safety).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 208, 210.
235. For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, examining whether "the 'impact' to
be analyzed under the RFA [is] a rule's impact on the small entities that will be
subject to the rule's requirements, or the rule's impacts on small entities in general,
whether or not they will be subject to the rule," see Cole, supra note 69, at 281,
287-97.
236. Obviously, the small cable operators would benefit from a cap on rates
charged by programmers.
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study of all those small entities who might be affected.237 Fur-
ther, in American Trucking Ass'ns, the EPA was not required to
conduct regulatory flexibility analyses because the EPA's stan-
dards directly affected only the states, who would then impose
regulations on small businesses.238 In so ruling, countless small
businesses that may not be required by law to answer directly to
a federal agency, but who nonetheless face direct consequences
to their financial state when their suppliers or customers do, will
not receive relief under the RFA and SBREFA.
A fourth finding from the cases may shed some light upon the
question of what sort of teeth the RFA, as amended by SBREFA,
has in providing real regulatory relief to small businesses. In
each of the two situations when the court remanded the rule, the
SBA was involved, not only in stressing the need to comply with
the RFA and SBREFA, but also in exposing the potentially ad-
verse effects of the regulation on small businesses.239 This may
indicate that although the requirements of federal agencies un-
der the RFA cannot keep an anti-small business regulation from
being promulgated, it can expose the true effects of a regulation,
forcing agencies to examine such effects and to consider more
small business-friendly alternatives that achieve the same policy
goals. An agency may be able legally to promulgate a regulation
by conducting and publishing the required regulatory flexibility
analyses in accordance with the RFA, but if those analyses show
a disparate impact on a significant number of small entities, the
agency may run into political obstacles.s4 °
237. See Valuevision Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1204, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
238. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
239. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 139. In Greater Dallas, the court up-
held the right of plaintiffs to use affidavits from the SBA's Counsel for Advocacy in
establishing their case that a rule should not be exempted from the requirements of
the RFA. See Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d
765, 767-68 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
240. Of course, no guarantee exists that if the Small Business Administration gets
involved, the regulation will be remanded to the agency. The Small Business Admin-
istration was also involved in Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition, see supra text ac-
companying note 210, but that involved another political issue-the public policy de-
sire to free the Grand Canyon National Park of excess noise due to the proliferation
of flights overhead. See supra note 207.
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CONCLUSION
For all they contribute to the economy, small businesses de-
serve to have a voice in the federal regulatory process. The RFA
gives them that voice by forcing federal rulemaking agencies to
examine the potential effects of their rules and regulations on
small entities and to make such information known through the
Federal Register. The SBREFA amendments succeed in refining
the requirements of the RFA and, in particular, the judicial
review provision grants small businesses a weapon to insure
that federal agencies comply with the RFA. Judicial deference to
agency decisions, however, limits the power of judicial review. In
the end, true regulatory relief depends upon the agencies' own
commitment to fairness and balance for the small businesses
they regulate.
Jeffrey J. Polich
